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17 July 1981

# Near East/North Africa Report

(FOUO 23/81)



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## NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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ALGERIA

ALGERIAN TRANSITIONAL PHASE DISCUSSED

Paris PROJET in French May 81 pp 613-617

[Article by Pierre-Yves Cosse: "Algeria in Transition"]

[Text] In March 1979 the high-ranking Algerian officers chose one of their own, Chadli Bendjedid, the most senior officer in the highest rank, to succeed Houari Boumedienne. Their choice was ratified by a special FLN congress, specially assembled by the nation's leading cadres. After 2 years of his being president, one might well wonder if a new economic and political system is in the process of being established or if the changes which have been made are still minor ones.

Recognizing Economic Mistakes

What is new is certainly style and behavior, both in the analysis and presentation of problems and in decision-making. There exists a "Chadli style" marked by caution, good sense, and moderation which is making its mark in all sectors of government activity. Algeria no longer parades itself as a "model" for developing countries, it has no lessons to give, and it has stopped making defiant statements regarding its rate of development and modernization. It recognizes the errors which have been made, principally in the economic field, which it is high time to correct.

Thus there is open criticism of the ambitious industrialization of which Belaid Abdeslam (SONATRACH's first president) was the ardent promoter. The large industrial complexes, which resort to complex technologies and continuously call on massive and costly foreign cooperation for assistance, are creating new forms of dependence. Algerians do not have real control over their means of production: the most spectacular example of this is given by the Arzew natural gas liquefaction complex ("GNL [LNG]1") which is in the hands of the American El Paso Company, at a time when SONATRACH is in open conflict with that company about the price of gas it sells El Paso. Large production units are spread out all over Algeria, completely dependent on external sources for their supplies, still not having sufficient water resources at their disposal--all this is not likely to insure industrial take-off. By increasing the number of massive investments, too many Algerians have delayed the time when they should be taking on the responsibility of making the new means of production work. This whole critical phase has given rise to appraisals being drawn up under the responsibility of the new minister of planning, appraisals which have not been made public in

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detailed form.\* Nevertheless the press has made reference to cases of factories working at only 10, 20, 40 or 50 percent capacity, but one cannot distinguish between cases of slow start-up and somewhat definitive failures. From this has resulted a new industrial "discourse," set out particularly in the Algerian 5-year plan (1980-1984); priority is given to finishing projects underway, to rigorously programming investments, to creating small and medium-sized enterprises which will do subcontracting for large national enterprises, to strengthening the economic role of the wilayas, and to redistribution benefiting light industries which are less capitalistic and likely to satisfy immediate needs.

Regarding hydrocarbons, the debate has been more confused, for questions of personality have been mixed into it. The Abdeslam and Ghozali group (Abdeslam and Ghozali being SONATRACH's first two presidents) has criticized the present minister in writing (which is a breach of the code of conduct among Algerian leaders): the dispute revolves mainly around the price of natural gas which at the moment has not been allowing Algeria to derive a substantial income. More generally, the criticism is concerned about a certain amount of squandering of scarce natural resources which become more valuable with the passage of time. Would it not be better to conserve subsoil resources longer rather than "squander" the dollars earned from them in costly and unrealistic projects? It is true that the time when Algerian oil resources will be exhausted is near (about 15 years) and that production has already started to decline. To be sure, natural gas is taking over, but its development (on the technical and commercial level) has proved to be much more complicated and costly than anticipated.

Large-scale overexpansion in agriculture has also been condemned. Grouping together 22,000 European farms--which were the most fertile land--into 2,000 so-called "self-managed" properties which frequently exceed 1,000 hectares has presented management problems which are not yet resolved. So there are plans to reduce the size of the properties and to assist small private farmers, particularly with credit. Since "industrial" excess is meant to disappear, establishing industrial complexes on good farming land is prohibited and the choice of a site involves consent of the Walis and the municipalities. Agricultural prices paid to producers and agricultural wages will be raised in order to reduce the disparities with remuneration in industry.

One finds the same sense of balance and the happy medium in the financial sector: new importance is accorded to balancing the big accounts, particularly to eliminate any risk of external pressure. Regarding external debt, the debt service to export ratio rose to 27 percent in 1979; this was considered excessive and led to imports of heavy industrial equipment being reduced. The inflow of dollars caused by the doubling of oil prices since the beginning of 1979 is improving the financial situation and during the second half of 1980 made it possible to import massive amounts of everyday consumer goods with a view to meeting the most pressing needs. Balancing the budget is also recognized as desirable. The task of financial monitoring is being upgraded; a Revenue Court has been set up, while the authority of banks, which has been weak up to now, has been increased, particularly in regard to state enterprises.

\*Only the amount of what is "remaining to be completed" under the heading of projects listed in the two preceding plans have been published.

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#### Political Reconciliation

Internal politics as well are marked by moderation. There has been nearly total political amnesty (with the exception of Boudiaf and Ait Ahmed); Chadli must have forced Ben Bella's release on his peers. At the time of the Kabyle unrest (spring 1980), there was a phase during which the authorities made use of provocation and lost control of events, after which moderation carried the day, at least temporarily. Arrests were kept down and all persons charged were set free. Algeria without a doubt is one of Africa's countries with the fewest political prisoners.

Finally, Franco-Algerian relations have been marked by a desire for detente and caution. The new president gives interviews to radio and the French press. A serious crisis over immigration was averted when the president of the French Republic abandoned the idea of forcing a sizable number of Algerians settled in France to speedily return to their country. The Sahara and POLISARIO are ceasing to be a source of serious tensions between the two countries, and France is gradually becoming genuinely neutral.

If style makes the man, we are beginning to know who Chadli Bendjedid is: he is a man who likes order, he mistrusts theoreticians and technocrats cut off from everyday realities, and he detests "rabble-rousing" (such as that evidenced by the campaign, a short-lived one it is true, against social ills); he is empirically-minded and desires to provide concrete solutions to the everyday problems of his countrymen, particularly by reducing shortages, and housing and transportation difficulties; he is an Algerian concerned about reconciliation and national unity, and he is ready to come to an understanding with his enemies, domestic and foreign, out of respect for stubborn nationalism.

Not only are the preferences of Algeria's new president well known but also for 2 years now his powers have been considerably strengthened. He has progressively eliminated his principal adversaries by gentle methods. Also, in the wake of the Kabyle troubles the party's prerogatives, which had been evidence of the president's impotence, were cut back to his apparent benefit, though the president is still permanently monitored by his peers. Has a "Chadliism" been born after 2 years of maturing, and is it ready to transform orientations which are still vague into clear policies?

#### The Means of Change Are Nonexistent

In order to replace the "state capitalism" set up by Houari Boumedienne, a new formula would have to emerge. In fact, neither the ideology, the methods nor the personnel teams for its replacement exist. Perhaps President Chadli has opened up a phase of transition to a new regime, but this phase has certainly not ended.

First of all the new president lacks a clear ideology. From this standpoint, Chadli is not an Algerian Deng Xiao-Ping. All one has to do is run through official documents to observe nearly total continuity. Chadli Bendjedid could have sifted through the legacy of his predecessor, considering that "Algerian socialism" consisted of several major orientations: harnessing national resources (land and hydrocarbons), keeping state control over the tools necessary for rapid development (state enterprises), fixing priorities by means of a medium-term plan,

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an active income policy, social expenditures and health, and struggling against illiteracy. Other mechanisms would have been considered as means or methods to adapt according to circumstances: extending nationalization of the means of production to the service sector or to small businesses, the degree to which there is concentration in industry and banking, a few state enterprises having a monopoly over import rights, and fixing production prices in an authoritarian way. Unless these "gains" are questioned, President Chadli's preferences will remain at the state of wishful thinking and changes will remain marginal. Rigid official doctrines permanently limit his margin for maneuvering.

For example, in order to establish either state enterprises or private companies which are either medium-sized or small, those companies must not have to wait several years to obtain equipment or necessary spare parts from state enterprises which have "overall import authorizations" at their disposal and use them on a priority basis for their own needs and those of other large companies. Neither will there be any diversification of the industrial network without far-reaching modification of the import system and without changes in taxes and credits. For the moment, this mechanism is part of the gains which cannot be questioned. By the same token, boosting a private sector which would compete for services assumes that the appropriation of means of production be abandoned for activities like the hotel business which the Algerian Government, given the current state of its capabilities, cannot adequately manage.

Most of all, a clear method for regulating the economy should be chosen. The situation is currently a paradoxical one. On the one hand the market does not take responsibility for determining prices and general production trends. On the other hand there is no real Algerian "GOSPLAN": the Ministry of Planning is a weak institution and its principal interventionary activity is concerned with investments. The technical ministries and state enterprises have at their disposal a large margin of autonomy for setting their monopoly prices, disregarding the requirements of the coordination of sectors. At this time, when new production entities are starting to supply the domestic market in a meaningful way, the problem of logical consistency is becoming sharpened. Either Algeria has to provide itself with a mandatory centralized planning system which sets objectives and norms at all stages of production via sector ministries, or it has to agree to let supply and demand gradually come into play in sectors where a certain amount of competition can show up, although it may mean subsidizing some basic products for consumer benefit such as is done already. Because of existing shortages and extensive hoarding--of cash--this last general policy could be implemented only gradually. An essential prerequisite is massive reduction in paper money in circulation, whatever way it is done (voluntary conversion into savings at financial institutions or German-style authoritarian monetary reform). If a choice is not made, the unofficial market will continue to expand and will become official, while state enterprises will still be in the process of asking the financial authorities to replenish their operating capital in the form of appropriate funds.

#### Cadres Are Lacking

For this kind of reorientation there needs to be a homogeneous team which is not now the case. Certainly there are some quite brilliant and competent politicians surrounding President Chadli, the prototype being the current minister of foreign

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affairs, Mohamed Benyahia. But in this underdeveloped country the elites are small and were decimated by the colonial war. There has been an unfilled void since the removal of Belaid Abdeslam, whose arguments can be questioned but not his intelligence and character. The minister of planning, who lived for a long time in the United States, is not sufficiently entrenched politically to assert himself in the areas of both theory and organization. The replacement of leaders is slow and difficult; the former president had promoted technocrats but they have fallen back in cases where they had not gained sufficient credentials in the war of liberation. The ALN [National Liberation Army] has already supplied Algeria with many of its cadres and it is not in a position to flood the country with leaders of a high standard. Cadres with influence benefit from income due to their status even when they are recognized by everyone as incompetent.\* To be sure, ministers or leading figures in state enterprises are replaced from time to time, but those actions remain limited. In a context such as this one the Boumedienne system, which is supported by only a minority but has to its credit the fact that it is established, shows itself to be relatively secure. Many Algerians, having seen their country narrowly escape chaos in the period which followed independence, fear change, whatever change it may be. They are fearful of the disorder which would be caused during an initial period by reforms and sudden changes of officials, disorder which would be difficult to avoid in a country in which family, regional and political clans are powerful. Finally, the president and his government are not protected from political reactions by the late president's supporters. An excessively pronounced opening up would be interpreted as a "Sadatization" of the economy, and rapprochement with Egypt by a member of the "Rejection Front" seems difficult to conceive of in the short term. The behavior of Algerian leaders and cadres is characterized by great caution, and a wait-and-see attitude prevails over the spirit of initiative.

Therefore, for 2 years many steps which have been taken are negative, symbolic or limited in character. The large industrial projects have been checked and even called into question (the third Arzew liquefaction plant, for example) but no small and medium-scale industrial policy has begun. The breaking up of SONATRACH into several autonomous companies was announced at the beginning of 1980, yet there is still only a single SONATRACH in existence. The marketing of agricultural products has been made more flexible, since self-managed areas can sell directly in the market, but the restructuring of enterprises has not started. Although a 600-page document called "Draft 1980-1984 Plan" was debated by 2,000 representatives at a conference, specific choices were avoided, whether they had to do with structural reforms or large projects. Algeria's march towards development was slowed rather than its direction shifted. Strict regulations which are still in place are being bent. Thus, every year a million Algerians are able to bring back in accompanying baggage from France several billions worth of goods not recorded at customs, goods which are being financed illegally according to Algerian law, with the help of 850,000 Algerian immigrants.

Can Algeria remain in this halfway situation for long, the situation of a bureaucratic state-controlled but tolerant system? On the strictly economic level there

\*The struggle against corruption which started several months ago is introducing a new risk for cadres with influence.

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is no reason for the system to become rapidly obstructed: petroleum and natural gas income allows Algeria to import whatever is strictly necessary to insure its population's minimal needs and to carry out a certain amount of development, and the freedom of movement between the two Mediterranean coasts guarantees a flexibility which is indispensable.

On the other hand, in the social area, the risks are considerable but vague. The emerging working class, which has been given preferential treatment by the government, is expressing a growing discontent in the form of still isolated strikes. The discontent is the result of housing, transportation and supply difficulties, and cost of living problems (including the unofficial market) while democratic participation efforts are taken over by the FLN or UGTA [General Union of Algerian Workers] bureaucracy or by the management of the national companies. In spite of the massive school enrollment effort (nearly 4 million children in school), young people are uncomfortable between two cultures and two models of consumption, are often without work (the level of unemployed persons in urban areas is 20 percent), and can become radicalized, particularly under the guise of Moslem fundamentalism which is experiencing an undeniable renewal. Even the possibly sizable return of immigrants who feel attached to certain European values (secularism, union rights) might disturb the social and political equilibrium.

Algeria lives in uncertainty and a state of incompleteness. The enthusiasm of its leaders and its foreign supporters, particularly the French ones, has disappeared. We should not be surprised by a situation like this. A country which was deprived of its cultural, social and political identity by the colonial power and which is experiencing a tremendous population and economic explosion will only achieve a viable and accepted method of regulation slowly. What Third World country can claim to have found lasting solutions less than 20 years after independence?

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IRAN

IRANIANS IN UK RECEIVE APPEAL REPORTEDLY FROM BANI-SADR

LD270918 London THE TIMES in English 27 Jun 81 p 1

[Article by Hazhir Teimourian]

[Text] Iranians living in Britain last night circulated what was described as an appeal by Mr Abolhasan Bani-Sadr, the deposed president, calling on the people of Iran to resist tyranny. This is the first reported statement from Mr Bani-Sadr since he was last seen on June 12. He is in hiding.

In separate messages to the people and to the armed forces of Iran, Mr Bani-Sadr said he did not recognize the legality of his deposition.

"You must continue to resist the imposition of any tyranny on you, whether it be of local origin, or coming from abroad, so that our people will gradually gain faith in themselves and in a better, more progressive future," he was quoted as saying.

The appeals were circulated in the form of a duplicated document bearing the title Islamic revolution, that of Mr Bani-Sadr's recently-banned newspaper. Exile sources said the statements were telephoned abroad on Wednesday from somewhere in Iran.

The Iranian authorities have said the former president was still in the country and orders were given to the people to arrest him on sight. There has been speculation that he had fled to Egypt.

His disappearance came as a climax to a rising tide of criticism by religious fundamentalists. He was finally stripped of his office by Ayatollah Khomeyni on Monday.

Calling himself the elected president of Iran, Mr Bani-Sadr said the Islamic Republican Party (IRP) of clerical fundamentalists which dominates parliament, owed its majority to ballot rigging and intimidation of voters. In any case, the total of its apparent support in the parliamentary elections did not exceed four million, whereas the president was elected to his post by 11 million people.

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In the first of the messages, addressed to the armed forces, the former president urged them to fight on until final victory over Iraq was achieved, saying that in the present critical situation that Iran faced his own predicament was immaterial. It was of vital importance that the armed forces should prevent outside factors from weakening their morale, or traitorous hands stabbing them in the back.

He defended his role as the former commander-in-chief of the armed forces, saying that he had quadrupled their efficiency from the dark days at the start of the war with Iraq, not through interference in military matters or oratory, but through the encouragement of talent and the delegation of responsibility.

Mr Bani-Sadr said many commanders frequently complained to him of interference by leaders of the IRP. He quoted a grandson of Ayatollah Khomeini saying that the IRP preferred the loss to Iraq of the southern oil province of Khuzistan to the consolidation of his (Mr Bani-Sadr's) political position through victory in the war.

Mr Bani-Sadr also told the armed forces of his faith in Islam and in the Iranian nation, saying that his Islam was not a religion of hatred, revenge and inferiority complexes, as was that of "the plotters that deposed me," but a religion of love and freedom, growth and initiative.

In his message to the "men and women of Iran," Mr Bani-Sadr particularly praised the resistance of his women supporters in the face of intimidation by "the club-wielding rabble," indicating that the women of Iran had appreciated his efforts to gain their liberation. He also expressed his hope in the young people of Iran.

The young, he said, could not grow and fulfil themselves in a country that lacked freedom, but until they rose to free themselves, "general insecurity and civil war, repression and economic stagnation will continue."

The deposed president ended his message: "I have put my hope in you, the young generation of Iran. You and I have entered into a pact together, a pact of solidarity, a pact of resistance. The time has come to be true to our promise."

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LIBYA

BRIEFS

FAO CONTRIBUTION--In April, Libya made a contribution of \$1 million to the drive by Edouard Saouma, director general of FAO (United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization) for emergency food aid for Africa. This contribution was presented to Mr Saouma by the Libyan secretary for land reform and development, Bashir Jaudat, and by Ammar Taggazy, secretary of the people's committee of the Rome political office. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 22 May 81 p 1409] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 9434

SAHARAN AGRICULTURE CONFERENCE--A conference of the agriculture ministers of the countries bordering on the Sahara, in which Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, Chad and Libya took part, was held in Tripoli from 17 to 20 April. At the close of this conference, several resolutions and decisions were adopted concerning cooperation between the Arab countries in the fields of agriculture, irrigation, transformation of the Saharan regions into arable land, and the development of underground water. The conference stressed the need for meetings between specialists and technicians in the hydraulics field. It recommended, moreover, organizing a conference on directions in agriculture and the exchange of information and potentialities in this field, just as it recommended cooperation in the fields of cattle food industrialization and cattle raising. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 22 May 81 p 1409] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 9434

GARMENT ORDERS--The bulletin DIMEX ADJUDICATIONS, published in Paris by the CFCE [Council of Commercial Federations of Europe], reports that the Public Company for Garments (PCG), P O Box 15182 Tripoli (telex 20073 Malabis), uniting the five national Libyan clothing import companies, wishes to place very large orders in numerous countries, among them France. It envisages submitting samples to Tripoli before the end of May. The PCG is therefore asking interested concerns to go to Tripoli with documentation, prices cost and freight Tripoli, and samples. [Excerpts] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 22 May 81 p 1409] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 9434

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MOROCCO

VARIOUS POLITICAL FORCES IN NATION SURVEYED

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 15-21, 22-28 May, 29 May-4 Jun

/Article by Fu'ad Abu Mansur: "AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI Opens the File on Moroccan Democracy"/

/15-21 May 81 pp 37, 38/

/Text/ The main characteristic of Moroccan political life is its pluralism. This is clearly obvious from the titles of the domestic newspapers and publications that proliferate in vendors' kiosks in Rabat and Casablanca and in the hands of the youths who circulate in front of cafes and bars or line up at corners and before traffic lights.

A mere quick glance at these newspapers will underline the different positions of various groups in the Moroccan family, showing that the options of the right, center and left are sometimes compatible, sometimes discordant, and that the parliamentary game is based on democratic rules: the majority makes the decisions and the opposition exercises the veto or the right of refusal. The decisive say ultimately rests with the majority, as is the case in deeper-rooted, older democratic traditions.

During my recent stay in Morocco, I met with party heads and organization secretaries. I also attended meetings in the Istiqlal and Federal Party members' cells. I visited the homes of popular officials and main branches. I talked with the editorial boards of the Arabic and French language party press. One product of this trip through the "machinery of the Moroccan party experiment" was that I ended up with a group of facts, most important of which are:

1. The majority of the Moroccan people, especially the young generation born in the fifties, has been 100 percent trained in parties and politically educated in ideological and union terms in the cities and heavy population areas, but this declines or pales in the rural and desert areas where the middle aged and the elderly provide the family or tribal options, in addition to other considerations.
2. Each of the five major parties has a basic traditional body of people on which it relies in the framework of political activity and mobilization. The Istiqlal Party relies on bourgeois personnel, particularly the petty bourgeois, who embrace the principle of equality. The Socialist Federation of Popular Powers is active in young and intellectual circles and stresses trade union activity as a means for

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changing social structures. The National Liberal Grouping attracts persons from the far right and the far left who have come to feel despair over traditional concepts in political and party areas. Then there is a constitutional monarchist party under the leadership of Ahmed Osman, who for 7 years played the part of prime minister in the cabinet which preceded the current one of Maati Bouabid. The Popular Movement led by Mahdjoubi Ahradane is strong in desert areas and is actively training Berbers, stressing the values of Moroccan cultural integrity, especially Berber integrity, by promoting the Amizigh language of the Amizigh peoples who are spread about in the Greater Atlas areas. The Moroccan Communist Party, known as the Party of Progress and Socialism, under the leadership of Ali El Yaata, is active in workers' cells and industrial concentrations, especially in Casablanca; it issues its newspaper AL-BAYAN in Arabic and French.

3. The proliferation of parties, with their diverse methods of fighting and their diverse concepts and demands, function within lines already laid out in the context of the country's basic options. There is a matter which is taken for granted, or a fixed element, in Moroccan politics which unites people on the right and the left. This is the democratic constitutional monarchy, which Moroccans are united in believing is the safety valve, the moral and material framework of the Moroccan identity, and the benevolent rule which supervises the progress of the political game and limits the fouls on the political playing field. Opposition radicals acknowledge that the king always tries to anticipate their criticisms and their reservations and that in a meeting he even laid stress on the need to improve the workers' standard of living, and went farther than the opposition in his emphasis.

4. Another fixed or obvious point is the unity of Moroccan territory and the just nature of the defense of the Western Sahara. This is a common denominator and does not admit of individual interpretation or debate among the 20 million Moroccans. The parties are united in believing that the Sahara war is a fabricated issue manufactured by Algeria to sap Morocco's vigor and shake the throne and that the Moroccans are prepared to negotiate directly with the Algerian regime to set out the bases for a solution and proceed toward a forthcoming union of the Maghreb countries in which each country will preserve its special economic and cultural characteristics.

5. Do these basic options limit the movement of Moroccan parties? What are they left with within these lines? The party officials I met stressed that the option of the war in the Sahara is a specific decision which all Moroccans have agreed upon. This unanimity does not diminish the importance of party life as a motive force for individual and group powers and a criterion for competition within the quest for better conditions. They also emphasized party contributions since independence in the realm of the establishment of modern structures for Morocco, the provision of public facilities and the choice of agricultural and industrial policies.

6. Here the margin in which the Moroccan parties function possesses a quixotic character. The media war flares only on the pages of newspapers and stays within the limits of censure, keeping organizations away from the experience of "lebanization" or the language of blood in the absence of diplomacy. Everyone is a monarchist and there are none of the Trojan horses of foreign systems. Even the newspaper profession reflects the childish quality of the first beginnings of the Arab press. The editors in chief of AL-'ALAM, AL-MITHAQ, AL-MUHARRIR and AL-BAYAN

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exercise self-criticism and say, "We lack the resources for keeping up with the press of the modern era. Our activity does not transcend the release of party brochures." The parliamentary opposition is also quixotic. The media of the Socialist Federation of Popular Powers and the Party of Progress and Socialism ventured to state that fraud was committed in the 1978 elections and as a result certain loyal parties received a weight out of proportion to their real strength. The criticism remained within the context of the media and did not get to the point of the withdrawal of opposition deputies from parliament. Today news is circulating to the effect that the federalist deputies are proposing to withdraw from the discussion again in the event the parliamentary period extends to next summer. However, an informed federalist source told AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI that the subject of withdrawal is being carefully discussed in party circles and has not been resolved in a final fashion.

5. /sic/ The phenomena which merit attention are the flareups within the traditional Moroccan parties. Schisms have afflicted party life since 1956. In 1959, the Istiqlal Party, which represents a patriotic legacy of struggle, split apart, and the National Federation of Popular Forces and the Socialist Federation of Popular Forces branched out from it, the former under the leadership of the father of the Moroccan left, Abdallah Ibrahim, and the latter under the leadership of Abdel Rahim Bouabid. In 1978, we witnessed the birth of the National Liberal Grouping under the leadership of Ahmed Osman, who, in turn, had fought in the ranks of the Istiqlal Party like many of the technocrats on the Moroccan stage. Today there is a parliamentary rift in the National Liberal Grouping under the leadership of the deputy Ahmed Belhadj. However, this secessionist group has not yet conceived a mature political program or declared its objectives.

In any event, the outbursts in the Moroccan parties are not a sudden occurrence. Observers emphasize that they are a burdensome legacy that has been with the nationalist parties since the dawn of independence. The late Allal El Fasi, the first man of the Istiqlal Party, warned of this phenomenon in his book "Self Criticism." It is obvious that party rifts are not a Moroccan characteristic but a worldwide one. Gaullism has become "Gaullisms," Marxism "Marxisms" and Maoism "Maoisms." It is the struggle of ideas which is fragmenting the traditional structures. The first rift in the Moroccan national movement occurred when Mohamed Hassan El Ouazzani was compelled to establish the National Party, introducing into party life a spirit of religious fanaticism and chauvinism--two manifestations of tactics of "slander and reproach" which party people refer to when they talk about organizations that stand in their way.

Moroccan party figures are united over the fact that King Mohamed the Fifth was the father of Moroccan democracy. He formed the first coalition government in the history of Morocco, which embraced all political elements, although Allal El Fasi stayed out of it, charging that its members were not compatible, in the speech he gave on the eve of 20 August 1956. To satisfy the criticism, Mohamed the Fifth formed a cabinet headed by Moubarak El Bakay, with the participation of the Istiqlal Party, on 27 October of the same year. In the meanwhile, trade union life was establishing a tradition of regular activity. The Moroccan Federation of Labor became a real force in the hand of the Istiqlal Party. This was the period when the party was united. However, the shadow of the National Federation of Popular Powers was moving on the horizon of Moroccan political life under Mehdi Ben Barka, who rebelled against the paternal framework of the party. The rift did not



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take final form until 6 December 1959 and that was the basic turning point in the course of Moroccan parties.

The main split created secondary ones, including the Moroccan Federation of Labor, the National Federation of Moroccan Students, the General Federation of Workers as a rival of the Moroccan Federation of Labor, and the General Federation of Moroccan Students as a rival of the National Federation of Students. In this period, that is, on the eve of the sixties, party orientations defined themselves in the wake of the radical dispute between M'Hamed Douri, the current minister of equipment (who at that time was minister of economy) and Abdel Rahim Bouabid, now the first secretary of the Socialist Federation of Popular Powers.

In this historical context, there were three forces of attraction, and these resulted in the emergence of the National Federation of Popular Powers, the loyal son of the Istiqlal Party and the Socialist Federation of Popular Powers. Abdel Rahim Bouabid stated that the change or alteration in the title was aimed at avoiding the confusion which old party members of the National Federation exploited in Casablanca, retaining this title though they did not by any stretch of the imagination reflect its essence.

Mehdi Ben Barka paused at length in his "Book on the Revolutionary Choice" to discuss the reasons for party fragmentation, considering it tantamount to a historic error. He said: "There are three errors:

- "1. Our incorrect evaluation of the half measures we were compelled to adopt.
- "2. The closed framework through which our struggles passed without the participation of the masses of the people.
- "3. The obscurity surrounding our ideological positions."

Political and ideological pluralism began a new stage, proceeding from diverse notions of national activity. Public freedoms were not a gift "from above" to people active in the press and in ideas. When the National Federation of Popular Powers was given responsibility for the cabinet along with Abdallah Ibrahim, a wave of arrests took place which extended to Mohamed El Basri and Abdel Rahman El Youssofi, two prominent figures in the National Federation. By the time Morocco was taken with shock at the death of Mohamed the Fifth, the option of public freedoms had become strongly rooted in people's spirits and had become a demand equaling those of bread and a decent living in importance.

When Hassan the Second inaugurated the first session of the first elected parliament in the history of Morocco, he insisted on the need to "pursue the democratic course to its natural ends." He said, "We have refused to do anything except to relinquish all tasks of our own accord and free will, restricting ourselves to the areas of competence exercised by heads of states in democratic countries."

Party pluralism became more firmly implanted in the second parliamentary experience of July 1970. On 22 July of that year, the Istiqlal Party and the National Federation of Popular Powers signed a charter announcing the birth of the National Bloc. Abdallah Ibrahim addressed himself to the circumstances which dictated its establishment, saying "The new experiment is fertile and has significance not just from

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the positive standpoint but also from the negative one as well. It has caused us to become sensitive to weak spots in the structure of the struggle and in methods of action and initiative.

Although the National Bloc experiment's activities and results were limited, it did establish a coalition tradition which strengthened democratic options in Morocco and helped direct attention to the pitfalls of ignoring defects in the administrative superstructure. The Moroccan ruler put his hand on the defects and held intensified contacts with the parties on the eve of Ahmed Osman's assumption of the Moroccan premiership on 19 November 1973, stressing the need to build a democratic Morocco which would rely on a government instrument helping to promote the course of construction and growth. The party heads responded to the royal appeal in letters in which they replied by setting out their notions of the creation of a Morocco which was able to respond to the challenges of the age. The answers came from Allal El Fassi for the Istiqlal Party, Abdallah Ibrahim for the National Federation of Popular Powers, Abdel Rahim Bouabid for the Socialist Federation of Popular Powers, Dr El Khtib for the Popular Democratic Movement, Mohamed Hassan El Ouazzani for the Democratic Constitution Party, and Ali El Yatta for the Party of Progress and Socialism.

The royal missive and the parties' responses to it were basically oriented toward the process of "deepening" Moroccan democracy and finding a way to avoid the ineptitude of former ruling officials. It was given to everyone to believe that no party had a monopoly on the right to speak in the name of the people but that all conceptions, in spite of their different tendencies and notions, had to be an embodiment of collective concerns. Mr Ahmed Osman strove to make this slogan reality when he assimilated a large number of opposition members into the corps of employees cooperating with him. He worked tirelessly over a pair of reforms in the 7 years in which he headed up the Moroccan cabinet: the selection of competent personnel and the modernization of staffs and structures to accommodate the new economic and cultural developments.

This hard time in the life of the Moroccan parties passed, regardless of their internal contradictions, thanks to the royal safety valve. The political shocks in the modern history of Morocco were of such force that they created profound upheavals in party structures and in addition there were errors, special calculations and debts on the part of specific persons. Today, each of the main parties bears a legacy of accomplishments and frustrations, but the dynamic of renewal has brought figures and leaders to the fore who are up to the current challenges.

Here the Istiqlal Party is gambling on retaining its basic features, benefitting from its former brilliance in attracting new staffs, while its adversaries continue to describe it as "the sincere guardian of bourgeois interests," criticising it for a sort of stagnation of leaders and directives. They also observe that its popularity has not diminished with time, since there are broad groups of Moroccans who aspire to reap the fruits of private ownership and personal wealth. However, in the minds of citizens, the Istiqlal Party remains a kind of Moroccan "Gaulism," on account of its struggle under Allal El Fassi and his comrades.

As for the National Federation of Popular Powers, that witnessed the secession of the majority who founded it under ideological circumstances opposed to the Istiqlal

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current, and Abdallah Ibrahim alone remains on the stage. We do not know why he kept the party's name after the collective fragmentation which beset it on the eve of the eighties.

The Party of Progress and Socialism branched off from the French Communist Party in the days of the protectorate. Its opponents accuse it of keeping an open line to Moscow, which is important since Moroccans are concerned with their religious values and do not accept Communism as a political system. The popularity of this party declined after the defeats of world communism, the termination of the "red tyranny" in Moscow and the death of 'Abd-al-Nasir. However, Ali El Yatta, in his remarks and statements, emphasizes the "national character" of his party and is close to the principles and goals of the National Federation of Popular Powers. He also relies on labor and women's organizations in promoting the class struggle in Morocco.

While the popular movement managed to form a party reserve for the Istiqlal Party, especially since its activists had fought for independence and were a model for Moroccan citizens who were in touch with their country and its actual situation, its adversaries rebuked it for having a racist character that made it a trump card in many people's hands. Proof of that, those opposed to it say, is the fact that its notions disappointed a large group of its adherents, who split off from it and formed other parties, including:

El Khatib and El Oukouti, who formed the Popular Constitutional Movement.

El Sanhadji Abdallah, who formed the Labor Party.

Abdel Rahman El Kouhan, who launched the Party of Reform and Unity.

The trade unions branching off from that, which are five in number.

As regards the National Liberal Grouping, which is relatively new, since it was founded in 1978, its opponents criticize it for "being in debt to the administrative apparatus and lacking a specific political program and ideology." They go so far as to describe it as "an artificial current which represents a mixture of interests." Naturally liberal officials reject these charges, saying "No one is able to monopolize political action and we came onto the political stage to fill a void that citizens were starting to grumble about."

The gates to debate are open and AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI quotes people's views accurately in an attempt to determine each party's position and present its accomplishments in the light of current challenges. The pluralism of parties is a phenomenon which deserves attention. Through their growth and vigor the democratic experiment in Morocco is being integrated.

/15-21 May 81 pp 39, 40/

/Text/ Ahmed Osman, 50 years old, the head of the National Liberal Grouping, the ruling majority party, is a man of liberal views and discourse. He has been implanting the tradition of "democratic struggle" since 1971, when he was appointed director of the Royal Court, then volunteered to lay the principles of the game

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out on clear foundations during the years 1973-79 as prime minister. He was then appointed ambassador to Bonn and Washington, respectively.

Today Ahmed Osman is free to devote his full time to Grouping affairs, striving to establish its positions on the Moroccan stage in the framework of the democratic experiment and its concomitant democratic features. This discussion with him was aimed at ascertaining the Liberals' place on the Moroccan political map and becoming acquainted with the game of majority and opposition in the structure of existing institutions and the context of situations coming to the fore on the Arab and foreign planes.

/Question/ Members of the Istiqlal and federalists say that the Liberal Grouping arose suddenly without preparatory arrangements and that it is a result of the latest election campaign. How do you view this assessment?

/Answer/ I described this point a few days ago in my meetings with the activists in the Grouping and at the massive rally we held in the town of Oujda. We believe in party pluralism while not seeking to balkanize political life in Morocco. The other parties must agree to enter or leave the new movement without wishing to monopolize political action in any of the stages of the national forward march. The game of democracy requires the involvement of a number of parties possessing different visions and conceptions.

To state that the Liberal Grouping was the result of the latest elections is not in keeping with reality. How can a disciplined political movement like the Liberal Grouping possess the wherewithal of power and legitimacy to come into being overnight?

When we examine the political terrain in Morocco, we observe that the traditional political parties, that is, the parties founded for the sake of regaining national independence, have not kept abreast of developments in domestic and international life. The leaders have not changed. We observe the same people remaining in policy positions. This does not mean that we do not feel appreciation for these leaders. I have been and still am engaged in discussions with them and am a friend of theirs. Therefore I believe I can speak without embarrassment.

In our new activity we felt, since the seventies, that it was necessary to establish a new political current to fill a kind of vacuum resulting from lapses in the modernization process. We present ourselves as standing in the line of succession of the National Movement, whose combative past we do not deny, although we are trying to inject new blood into it by bringing in new persons and styles and adjusting to the requirements of the current situation and the challenges that have accumulated.

In another area, there is apathy in local political life. We are striving to implant the dynamism of new activity in its place. It would have been easy to give birth to our movement before the elections when we were in positions of responsibility and were able to monopolize political decisions. However, we preferred to make a comprehensive opening and mobilization and appealed to the other parties to engage in a modern democratic life which was in keeping with the disturbed atmosphere inside and outside Morocco. This issue required planning and farsightedness

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on our part. Therefore we came into being and entered the 1976 local elections, in an unorganized fashion but with discernment. We again entered the legitimate elections of 1977 with more organization and greater competence based on a group of ideas and conceptions which we had carefully studied in depth. Ordinary citizens, like officials and candidates, discovered that the positions we were defending were important and they gave us their strong confidence.

#### A Realistic Program

/Question/ Observers say that your movement does not have an integrated program and that this imposes growing rifts on its ranks. They cite the "shock" recently caused by a parliamentary group which declared its independence of you, under the leadership of Mohamed Belhadj, who is intending to crystallize a new plan of action.

/Answer/ The fact that there are rifts does not mean that the movement does not have a program. Programs are easy to set down. I appeal to all to read the statements and speeches closely. They are devoid of the stirring promises which are frequently repeated in the marketplace to attracting followers but generally remain mere ink on paper. We have a program which is characterized by realism, transcending slogans and aiming at the execution of programs. We came into being with a reserve of accomplishments and we are continuing along this course within an equation which matches words with deeds.

/Question/ Could we have some examples?

/Answer/ We have been in the cabinet. I personally held the position of premier for a period of 7 years (1973-79). We have accomplished tangible things. Our equation is the following? achievements, then the development of a presence instead of a background of slogans or aspirations. The fact that there are rifts does not mean that the party does not have clear notions and specific principles. The Istiqlal Party is exposed to rifts. The federation that branched off from it has already experienced rifts as well. That does not mean that the people who seceded do not have integrated plans.

The latest secession which took place in the Liberal Grouping's parliamentary formation did not arise from a dispute over principles. We are a "grouping" which has attracted a number of currents, ideas and political and social families. That does not stand in the way of our turning into a fighting party which has weight in political life, far removed from fanaticism and the tendency to take a simplistic view of others. Our goal is to eliminate the spirit of party bigotry and to reach a stage of openness and creative development.

#### We Are Not a Prop

/Question/ Why is the Liberal Grouping described as being close to the administrative apparatus? It is said that it draws its vitality and effectiveness from this. Is this characterization correct?

/Answer/ This is a characterization which has no basis in fact. We have gone through experiments which the administration supported but we have also proved on numerous occasions that we are not a party which was essentially founded to win

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elections, or which the administration founded to lean on. The popularity of membership in our organization disproves these allegations. We have a place on Moroccan political soil. We hope that others will recognize our capital. We appeal to them to take a more sporting attitude in dealing with us and looking upon us.

/Question/ The economic philosophy of the Liberal Grouping is based on capitalist liberalism. Don't you believe that there are poor classes in Morocco which view this philosophy with a kind of suspicion and rebel against its economic and social premises?

/Answer/ We believe in giving the individual absolute freedom and in giving free rein to individual initiative as an element of social liberalism not capitalist liberalism. We also put priority on training individuals and groups, overseeing government activity and holding officials to account. The government plays a basic role in the life of the individual and the group; we are not against that. We are liberals who set forth from the premise of our equation, which holds that the individual must work, be active and move as a part of and on behalf of the group.

/Question/ Don't you therefore adhere to the class struggle? There are distinctive social classes in Morocco which have special distinguishing features. We observe that acting to fill the gap moves the young generation in particular and results in attracting rich, poor, affluent and needy people. Aren't you neglecting this basic struggle a little?

/Answer/ We do not talk about class struggle because we do not want to apply foreign philosophies or imported ideologies. Class struggle is a Marxist notion which we reject. Conversely, we are aware that there are social differences in Morocco, as in other countries of the world. We fight them with all our strength and devote an important part of our discussions and statements to them.

Everyone's Party

/Question/ Don't you sometimes feel that the Liberal Grouping is working to protect the interests of specific groups in Moroccan society?

/Answer/ Not at all. Our line of struggle attracts other classes of Moroccan society, students, workers, and intellectuals belonging to all social classes, the newness of our movement notwithstanding. In a short period of time we have attracted broad groups of Moroccan masses. Let us look at our latest meeting in the town of Oudjda with young people, peasants and classes of limited social means. We also attract employers and affluent people. What is to stand in the way of that? Other parties are launching a new level of criticism against us every day: sometimes we represent the bourgeoisie, sometimes they charge that we are defending capitalism domestically and abroad. These are truly amazing things. Our goal, contrary to everything they charge, is to liberate the economy from foreign dominance, grant the productive sectors a Moroccan character and preserve our territorial unity. We have also essentially been formulating laws which will give workers the right to participate in profits along with company owners. We have given proof, "on the ground," of our principles in support of liberation, and this is what the Moroccan citizen needs.

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/Question/ Do you believe that party life in Morocco has created a qualitative change in the thinking and mentality of the citizen? We observe that the major parties are vertical rather than horizontal in orientation and that traditional categories dominate. In other words, have the parties transcended their character as an instrument for preserving the interests of the groups they represent in order to embody a national action over which all citizens can agree?

/Answer/ Your question forms part of the basic conceptions of the Liberal Grouping. We have made it a general practice to state that we are suffering from a void in traditional political life. A grave silence has been hanging over the nation, especially in the current stage, which is witnessing an intensification of problems domestically and abroad. We have said that it is necessary to penetrate the wall of silence and establish a new movement that will train young people and invite them to take part in the forward march of the nation and the young. For a long time we have been waiting for awareness, vigilance and participation from the political parties, which continue to adhere to their worn out leaders. Therefore we have decided to cross the battle lines and have worked assiduously to wake citizens up and mobilize them to participate in domestic and national responsibilities.

#### A Democratic Pluralism

/Question/ Is the silent struggle among Moroccan parties likely to acquire a bloody character along Lebanese lines? What deterrent is there to prevent that? Following that, how is the arteriosclerosis among the parties on the one hand and among the wings that are fighting one another within each individual party on the other to be cleared out?

/Answer/ We deplore struggle among parties, while accepting the existence of pluralism, having reservations about the chaos it produces, and aiming at preventing the fragmentation or dilution of the scope for political action. Organization, frankness and mutual respect are necessary. Therefore we oppose party zealotry and some parties' attempts to monopolize the political scene. There are democratic ways to separate loyal forces from opposition ones, such as referendums and elections. Above and beyond that, we condemn repressive fascistic doctrines because they kill democracy.

The Liberal Grouping categorically believes that democratic constitutional monarchy is the guarantor of our unity and coexistence within a democratic climate and the defender of citizens against doctrines of repression and dominance.

/Question/ Are you satisfied with the government coalition which Maati Bouabid heads? How do you evaluate its achievements? It is stated that it lacks a harmonious commingling among members and that his majesty the king has repeatedly intervened to resolve the polarizations within it.

/Answer/ There can be no doubt that I address myself to this aspect constantly, stressing the need for solidarity and harmony during the difficult stage Morocco is now going through in terms of the economy, the society and defense. We hope that a strong government will be his majesty the king's companion and will be tantamount to a strike force along the lines of the royal armed forces.

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It is necessary that his majesty, who is the supreme commander of the nation, have strike forces, and we are proud of our strong army. There is also a need for a homogeneous government. It is obvious that every coalition government has advantages and faults. The faults generally rise to the surface and a curtain falls over the advantages. Coalitions demand harmony among the political groups who take part in them and among individuals. This is an extremely difficult matter and requires deep, careful study.

Our grouping is part of the government coalition. We bear responsibilities in the Legislative Assembly as part of our participation in the government his majesty the king has chosen in accordance with the conditions of the Moroccan constitution.

#### A Fifth Column

/Question/ Is there a fifth column in Morocco quietly working within the framework of party pluralism and preparing for more aggressive activity if circumstances become favorable?

/Answer/ What is the nature of this fifth column you are talking about?

/Question/ It could be parties, currents within parties, or a group of people outside the party framework who are prepared to cooperate with foreign bodies in order to weaken Moroccan resistance.

/Answer/ I know nothing about it to this moment. We are far from falling prey to the Lebanese predicament, because constitutional monarchy is a basic element for bringing people together and protecting our lines with /at least/ a minimum of protection against the dangers hanging over us. In sight of the environment that surrounds us, we must remain vigilant, strengthen our vigilance and spread it throughout the Moroccan masses. The best protection is guidance. The Moroccan people today enjoy greater resources than in the past for crushing the enemies' plots and exposing their intentions.

/Question/ Is it likely that the Moroccan press, with its various tendencies, is in the absence of censorship, likely to play the role of a Trojan horse in Moroccan society? Are there legal measures to deter any excesses that might occur?

/Answer/ When the situation concerns domestic security and the defense of institutions and sacred affairs, there are natural laws in every organized, well balanced country. We are struggling for freedom of the press and freedom of expression--with the context, however, of the laws and presentation of our national values.

The Moroccan newspapers are characterized by a patriotic nature in general, they strive to defend our genuine heritage and they are free from foreign involvements.

/Question/ What are the reasons why the Moroccan people are satisfied with the king and cling to the monarchy as if it were a justification for their existence, nationally and domestically?

/Answer/ That is fundamental question. It is generally stated that the Moroccan people have embraced the monarchy voluntarily and out of conviction. As regards the ruling Alaouite family, the people in it have lived as members of the Moroccan



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people up to this day. The citizens chose them to take the reins of power after they had discovered that they possessed the features and hallmarks of genuine patriotism. The ruling family, since ascending the throne, has embodied the aspirations of the Moroccan people. It has always been in the vanguard of struggle and resistance against enemies. This reservoir of patriotic good will has been deeply ingrained in the persons of King Mohamed the Second. They are two figures who crown the vision which has become firmly rooted in the hearts and minds of every Moroccan, that is, the vision of struggle and freedom. President Sekou Toure pointed out, in the Jerusalem Committee speech last week, that the Moroccan people closely adhere ideologically to the monarchy. There is no truth to the rumors being spread abroad; this is our actual situation, with its basic premises, in the life of Morocco on the domestic, Arab and international stages.

/22-28 May 81 pp 38, 39/

/Text/ Observers agree that the Socialist Federation of Popular Powers possesses a magnetic power on the Moroccan stage. People attribute this to the dynamism of its staff members and the fact that it has grasped the premises of social and cultural restlessness, especially among young people who have lost hope in traditional forms of struggle and aspire to "revolutionize" Moroccan structures and institutions.

Historically speaking, the Socialist Federation of Popular Powers arose out of the National Federation of Popular Powers which, in turn, arose out of the Istiqlal Party in 1959 as a consequence of the growing gap between generations which had become estranged in their notions of political and national action. The silent struggle among the leaders also had an effect on the process of ideological fragmentation which Morocco went through on the verge of the sixties. There is no doubt that Abdallah Ibrahim, nicknamed the father of the Moroccan left, reproached Istiqlal Party people for covering up exploitative acts which well-known Moroccans had been committing, called for greater equality in the context of equality of opportunity for all citizens, and prompted the young generation to assume positions of internal decisionmaking rather than clinging to an outmoded philosophy.

The Socialist Federation of Popular Powers stayed in the shadow of Abdallah Ibrahim's notions for some time before he went off on his personal political-ideological tangent. It is well known that when it arose, the National Federation contained such prominent personalities in the Moroccan political game as Boutaleb, Ben Barka, Ahmed Ben Souda, Abdallah El Sinhadjji, El Touhami, El Ouazzani, Mahdjoub Ben Seddik, Abdel Rahim Bouabid and Abdel Kader Sahrroui, but conflicts of views and interests scattered them in different directions. Secret and open formations and organizations arose from this. Today, Abdallah Ibrahim alone remains on the stage and mobilization activity has shifted over to Abdel Rahim Bouabid's organization, which aspires to "establish a socialist society in which there is no exploitation of man by his fellow man."

#### Young Staff Members

A number of political analysts say that there is no radical ideological dispute between the two federations. Such contradictions as exist are just in the context of personalities. This does not in any event diminish the experiment of the Socialist Federation, which wants to be a living academy for young Moroccan staff members

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and also turns to political action as a horse which it is betting on as a vehicle to mobilize administrative, social and political conditions, train numerous capable fighting people and bring the ideologue into the battleground of everyday life.

The Socialist Federation's allure increased as a result of the arrests and sufferings its party members went through, especially in the Oufkir era. The attainment of certain goals the federation demanded on the administrative and social levels also attracted supporters. This does not mean that Abdel Rahim Bouabid's organization has not experienced internal polarizations. The defects and the goals it was fighting over helped mend some rifts which might have deepened had they not been resolved at specific times. This may be attributed to the lack of coordination among the leaders' wings and branches on the one hand and the fact that the basic options of the Moroccan government transcended party notions or developed apart from them.

A group of premises or considerations determine the Socialist Federation's political geography on the map of Moroccan parties. These are:

1. The basic tenet of the federation's brand of socialism is collective ownership of the means of production and exchange, which are to be managed by producers through their organizations along with the government apparatus, which is to be subject to oversight by party organizations. This brand of socialism is practiced as a program of analysis and struggle. It rejects abstract models and the parroting of foreign experiences.
2. The application of a comprehensive strategy relying on the interconnection and equal importance of liberation, growth and democracy, with the objective of building a socialist civilization in keeping with the particular characteristics of the Moroccan people.
3. The need for economic liberation in order to attain an economic development possessing numerous complex facets, in the context of Morocco, first, then the Maghreb countries, as part of an integrated economic-developmental system which will lead to high rates of industrialization. The premise is an agricultural and agrarian reform emancipated from relations of subservience and directed toward self-sufficiency and exports.
4. The Socialist Federalists emphasize building a material base for development through integrated industrial projects to guarantee the integrity of the economic system within the framework of the domestic dynamism of accumulated capital and the effort to liquidate vertical relationships which could draw branches of production into centers of capitalist decisionmaking and guidance.

Responding to collective needs at the expense of individual ones is a condition which is connected to revolutionizing government structures, implanting real democracy and striving to formulate a genuine modern culture which will liberate citizens from dispossession and alienation. The instrument for realizing these goals is the party. The point of departure is self-criticism, and the success of the movement depends on young intellectuals who are liberated from social reaction.

5. All experiments at unity within the Arab nation are welcomed, no matter what their results, and an effort is made to place them firmly within a unified struggle which progressive popular organizations with united ideological options will lead, followed by development plans which are capable of providing true Arab unity on meaningful socialist bases.

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#### The Particular Character of Morocco

In actual practice, after studying the forms of the Socialist Federalists' struggle, we observe that these ideological premises have become confined, or have nearly become confined, to more realistic demands which are closer to the particular nature of the situation in Morocco. These are:

Raising the sharply expanding differences in incomes between ordinary families and the exploitative classes: 5 percent of the population monopolizes close to half the national income. The Socialist Federalists give this class the name "economic oligarchy."

The issue of the monopolization of farmland, especially irrigated land, by big Moroccans.

The issue of continuing the liberal platform, which eases the tasks of the Moroccan bourgeoisie and speculators.

Limiting the intensified economic crisis, the rise in the prices of foodstuffs and equipment and the growing problems of Moroccan exports, which are adding to the exploitation of the toiling masses and the spread of unemployment and misery. To curb this phenomenon, the Socialist Federation claims that real planning based on a dialogue with the masses in the context of local institutions is necessary and that recourse must be made to the basic nationalization of the means of production, transportation, exchange and lending, in addition, as radical change in the administrative structure remains a basic condition for reversing the economic decline.

Which of the Socialist Federation's economic demands have been realized? What accomplishments has the federation carried out in actual practice, now that it has a history of approximately 20 years of party activity?

A responsible source in the Socialist Federation told AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, "The political map in Morocco could become clearly known in the event honest elections were continuously held. This has unfortunately not happened. We had great hopes of attracting broad new groups to our party and consequently having the political map take clear form. This requires neutrality, or at least respect for the ballot box. People talk about guarantees. In municipal and village elections, these have been pro forma, and no consistent fraud has occurred. Therefore the Federal Party prevailed in Rabat (we have 29 out of 39 counsellors), Agadir (26 out of 31 counsellors), and Fez (19 out of 39 counsellors), while the Istiqlal Party has 16, and there are four independents, in addition to the municipalities of Sila, Ain Ziyab, Qalat El Saraghina, Inzeghane, and small towns like Djaad, Safar and El Araiche. In the town of Safi 20 of our people out of 31 succeeded in winning seats in the city council, but meddling disrupted the balance, especially in Tangiers, Safi and Kuneitra in the form of consistent invalidations."

#### Severe Criticism of the Government

He continued, "We presented the problem to the government and the cabinet. However, investigations did not take place in the desired depth. In our newspapers we published facts and circumstantial evidence on areas where fraud was committed. Since

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1977 no official denial has been issued. We do not want to stab democracy in the back. We have fought for it for decades. The result is that the first secretary, Mr Abdel Rahim Bouabid, lost in the city of Agadir."

The responsible source went on to summarize the severe criticisms against the current cabinet listing a number of points, including:

"1. The refusal to review economic options whose infeasibility has been underlined by experts as far as current conditions in Morocco go. For example, we published a report by the World Bank in the newspaper AL-MUHARRIR pointing out that Morocco has about 7 million citizens at the poverty level, out of a total population of 20 million. The report cited accurate details and figures which we had always used with officials.

"2. The dominance of irresponsibility. For example, last year the minister of education took serious decisions without previous consultation or study, and this created an uproar in the country. We said that no minister has the right to deal with future generations in this manner. At the education symposium held in Afran, on the basis of an invitation from his majesty the king, it became apparent from the discussion that the government had not agreed to the decisions of the minister of education, Mr Azzedine Laraki. The drought which occurred this year and the means with which it is intended to alleviate its effects have an influence on the irresponsibility of some ministers. Where are the prudent measures for coping with the disaster? Why these bureaucratic measures for coping with it, such as the formation of committees and study panels?

He went on, "Following the Afran debate, we kept the country from losing an academic year in the universities. However, our recommendations were not applied, in spite of our practical solutions, which take existing resources into consideration. For example, we propounded solutions to the problem of professors in higher education, then professors offering 35 hours of teaching a year, who are prepared to go to more than one institute. Who, however, is planning to create such a structural shift? The minister said, 'We are short of classrooms.' We counted the classrooms and found that they could accommodate a large number of students, to meet our needs for auditoriums. There is a vicious circle represented by a lack of oversight in the followup of everyday matters."

#### Easy Slogans

In this regard, the Socialist Federation is playing the part of a constructive opposition, as its officials say. "It presents alternatives, but there are officials who do not adopt them," continued the source, "because they consider that their options are correct. Does the disturbance that exists lie within the context of a conflict between party plans and government plans, and the refusal to accept specific concessions?"

Mr Mohamed El Yazighi, second man in the federation and member of the Political Bureau, said that it is not proper for such a conflict to be one of the enduring phenomena of the coalition government. It is necessary to agree on a minimum program to prevent the fragmentation of government activity. Regarding the "phenomenon" of democracy in Morocco, the federalists say that that should be deepened because retrogression will lead to failure. Therefore, they have agreed to stay in

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the city councils and the parliament, in spite of the fact that they have been "put on the sidelines," on grounds that through democratic activity they are promoting further dialogue for the sake of resolving existing problems. They are concerned about democratic gains, because, if they take a proper course, they can control and overcome the challenges of the Sahara. "Because of our record of democratic activity," says El Yazighi, "world public opinion sympathizes and sides with us in our foreign positions, and our opponents are embarrassed by our democratic atmosphere."

While the positions and conceptions of the Socialist Federation of Popular Powers are clear and specific and its accomplishments on the level of the ordinary life of the Moroccan citizen are tangible, the adherents of the Istiqlal Party, the National Liberal Grouping, the Popular Movement and the Party of Progress and Socialism Party criticize the federalists for using easy slogans and glibly exploiting the frustrations of the young people who are seeking a way of life for themselves within Moroccan society. They also direct blame at the federalists' monopolization of certain areas of Moroccan culture and refusal to work outside of them. Their observations in parliament are also sometimes characterized by a sort of negativism. In general, Istiqlal Party members say that Abdel Rahim Bouabid's organization has created an atmosphere of artificial class struggle in the country.

What is the truth behind these criticisms? How does Abdel Rahim Bouabid, first secretary of the Socialist Federation of Popular Powers, respond to them?

/22-28 May 81 pp 40, 41/

/Text/ Abdel Rahim Bouabid, first secretary of the Socialist Federation of Popular Powers, is the most prominent man in the opposition in Morocco. After independence his name was linked with ambitious schemes for establishing a Moroccan economy liberated from all subordination. He also helped launch the democratic experiment in Morocco and is considered one of the most prominent defenders of democracy's need for pluralism, liberalization and active trade union dialogue.

This conversation is an attempt to determine the Socialist Federation's place on the Moroccan party map and unearth its most important notions concerning the economy, democracy and politics in the context of local, Arab and international considerations.

/Question/ Disagreements exist over the orientation of the Socialist Federation. People say that there was some fraud in the latest parliamentary elections and that opposition still assumes a theoretical character, since you are holding onto parliamentary representation through the 31 deputies that belong to the Federation. How do you stand, between theory and practice?

/Answer/ There is no inconsistency in our stand. We could have withdrawn from parliament, but, after deliberations within the party apparatuses, it became clear that our struggle for democracy demanded that we not leave a vacuum. When a vehicle for struggle and a means for increasing it and deepening mass awareness exists, we will cling to it in order to express our criticisms and our notions concerning basic issues involving the country domestically and abroad. In spite of the fraud, we chose the path of combat instead of withdrawal and seclusion from the official and parliamentary arena.

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/Question/ Doesn't your observation concern a specific phenomenon and consequently fail to deal with democratic life in Morocco in its overall sense?

/Answer/ I am confining my statement to the recent parliamentary elections. We were asked to take part in them and a council was established by name of "the Council To Watch over the Elections." Basically we had demanded that the administrative apparatus hold to a position of neutrality so that the masses could express their options, if only in a relative sense. However, blatant interference took place in every electoral precinct and, in addition, pressures were brought to bear by the administrative apparatus, which chose people who would represent it. These administration representatives today constitute what is called the National Liberal Grouping. They were chosen by every means available by the administrative apparatus and that imparted a fraudulent turn to the elections. However, the struggle for democracy has yielded a number of gains which we cannot deny.

#### Participation in the Regime

/Question/ What, specifically, are the gains?

/Answer/ Freedom of the press, for instance. Press censorship has been eliminated as a part of the temporary positive measures which, it is said, will be final. There are other gains: a number of political prisoners have been released and some people living abroad have been able to come back to Morocco. However, there are other negative points, such as the 100 prisoners who are in jail because of their political positions. We are demanding that they be released, in parliament and on the street. This is a black mark in the ledger of democracy. We do not understand what distinction was made between the people who were released and the people who are still in prison. It is as if the administrative apparatus does not want to respond to all the urgent demands at once; it is as if it is asking for something in exchange.

/Question/ What in your view do they want in exchange? A freeze on demands by the Federation, for example?

/Answer/ One thing they want, for example, is our agreement to take part in the government. We have raised a question: How, and on what basis, will we agree to such participation? The government has ignored the fraudulent elections and it is propounding capitalist liberalism. How can we find common ground with a group that is opposed to our choices and conceptions? If there is common ground between us and the members of this government, the grounds for dialogue will be easy. We were told, "There is a grave threat to the unity of Moroccan soil." This is enough to bring everyone together, aside from other considerations; there is national consensus on this issue at all public levels, and a security council was established in the wake of this threat. We took part in it because it concerned the Sahara question and territorial unity. Our response was that it was not possible for us, however, to go beyond this participation: While we were concerned with national honor and mobilized ourselves on its behalf, we, as far as political, economic and cultural matters were concerned, could not reach common ground with the current government under these circumstances.

/Question/ Are you attempting to bring this government down and replace it with other bodies that are in keeping with the Socialist Federation's aspirations?

/Answer/ Our activity is aimed at rectifying the democratic process if only in the relative sense. We do not aspire to the democracy of England. We want to take stock of the particular nature of the Moroccan situation and the dangers threatening it, which also threaten Algeria in the same connection.

/Question/ Are you referring to a specific source of danger for Morocco and Algeria? How does the Socialist Federation view the Libyan role in the area, for example?

/Answer/ In 1974 Col al-Qadhdhafi said that it was not useful for the Arabs to create artificial entities in the area and that he wanted unity and wanted people to work toward unity. After that, he went through a change and started financing and training what is called Polisario, in order to establish a Saharan entity stretching from Libya to the Atlantic Ocean. This approach is bound to exacerbate tensions with Algeria and Mali. Today he is again extending his political, financial and administrative sovereignty over Mauritania and is asking the Mauritania to help create a Saharan Republic. Such a republic, in the event it is established, will threaten the identity of Mauritania and cause it to explode from within, because of the existence of the tribes and their proliferating disputes. Black Mauritania do not accept the dominance of Polisario or groups from the north, and they reject Libyan policies.

/Question/ The Socialist Federation opposes some of the economic options the present government is pursuing, but the alternative it presents, deep down, does not differ from the approaches that are being propounded in the Moroccan arena now.

/Answer/ The alternative we are propounding is different from the options of the present and previous governments. There is what is called the public sector, which plays a basic role in economic growth as an energetic, pioneering element. In the first years of independence, the progressive movement in Morocco was on the forefront in creating public sectors, but when governments came to power which espoused the liberal capitalist road, the facts of the situation changed: the public sector was not serving the total nation but voluntarily served the private sector, and the capitalist bourgeoisie which emerged after independence has deepened social differences in an increasing manner as a result of the economic policies that are followed. Our option is not just to nationalize sectors; it is also to include them in a developmental framework which will serve the nation. There is no point nationalizing if that does not involve the government and the administrative apparatus in the process of serving the whole people, not of serving the bourgeoisie and feudalism in the agricultural, industrial and commercial fields.

#### Staff Members and Notions Propounded

/Question/ Some Socialist Federation leaders are capitalists, like the deputy Ben Said and Abdel Quahed El Radi. Where do you stand between the notions you propound on the people's behalf and your bourgeois staff members?

/Answer/ Mr Ben Said is not a feudalist. He is a lawyer and exaggerates in estimating his wealth. Mr Abdel Quahed El Radi is a university professor and depends on his monthly salary. The village from which he is descended is collective property. Our leaders do not include capitalists. There are personnel with a bourgeois standard of living, but that is a situation which exists in most progressive

parties. A capitalist may say that he believes in the socialist option but that he is living in a capitalist system in spite of his struggle to change the structure of bourgeois society and launch it in a socialist direction. Such cases are to be found in the French Communist Party and the French Socialist Party, as well as the Italian one.

/Question/ In these cases, where is the revolutionary credibility? Is revolution a matter of slogans without live examples in the real world?

/Answer/ Let us turn the equation around: there are poor people who are active in fascist parties. The Istiqlal people, who have chastised us for these contradictions, have forgotten that this way of thinking goes back to the French administration in the days of the protectorate. The French told nationalists, "You are the people who are benefitting from the economic situation and the reforms we are carrying out." They would organize public demonstrations in downtrodden areas to support the French protectorate, demonstrations of migrants and bedouins for instance. People who criticise us for the contradictions aim to defend their own interests, having taken advantage of colonial conditions. In this fashion they have taken the place of the foreign colonialist. Even in the companies where they are taking "Moroccanization" measures, they have monopolized shares and positions they do not deserve and have struggled to acquire. These are manna from heaven for them. The serious thing is that they have sometimes used state money to monopolize company shares in the context of loan policy. Thus the government has helped create a capitalist bourgeoisie with the people's money. If Moroccan capitalists were like European ones, that is, if they had earned their wealth through their own efforts and their pioneering initiative, we would have said that that was natural and did not lie within the context of our struggle against them.

#### Outside the Game

/Question/ Of the Socialist Federation group, it is said that they follow a technique of debilitation. Do you agree with me or not? Are there no middle of the road solutions or openings to dialogue? The king, for example, has proposed a referendum on extending the Chamber of Deputies' term from 4 to 6 years.

You boycotted the referendum, whereas you had participated in previous ones on lowering the age of the crown prince from 20 to 18. How do you explain that?

/Answer/ I see no contradiction in the process of acceptance and rejection. We say that the recent elections were fraudulent and we do not want members of parliament to keep occupying seats they do not deserve. If we agreed that would be a contradiction, not the opposite. The issue is not one of 4 or 6 years; it is the desire not to lengthen the life of a fraudulent assembly. When we hold a boycott, that means that there is no guarantee underlining the soundness of electoral procedures. We want to stay outside the administration's game. We were asked at the end of 1979 to negotiate with the administrative apparatus on a specific matter related to the number of Socialist Federation deputies. We refused to bargain, out of the concern not to stab the course of democracy in the back.

/Question/ The Istiqlal members say that your secession from their party was a "historic crime" and that you have created a climate of artificial class struggle in Morocco.



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/Answer/ The Istiqlal Party was lacking in coordination and mobilization. There were bourgeois, lower middle class and peasant elements in its ranks who had gathered together to oppose colonialism. After independence, the emphasis is on issues changed and a schism occurred over ideology and mobilization. The Istiqlal members participate in the regime but they have forgotten the slogans they used to propound. The class struggle has arisen from the capitalist options in which they have sought refuge. We did not manufacture the class struggle--that is a consequence of the bourgeois environment. When the Istiqlal members monopolize companies, factories and land, they find themselves faced with a class of ordinary people who resist their acts. Herein lies the truth of the class situation which is becoming seriously aggravated.

/Question/ Why do people find fault with you for resorting in a big way to slogans in order to attract young people who are frustrated and feel economic and social despair?

/Answer/ There is a mass consciousness which we want to mobilize. Ask the workers and students, if you want, to find out how our notions respond to their aspirations. Society has produced the frustrations and bitterness which you are talking about. We want our young people to be liberated from them and therefore we give them the means to become liberated. Why shouldn't we mobilize people's powers to eliminate unemployment and social backwardness? Why do we note a concern to keep things as they are rather than move them forward? The defects do not lie in the ideas and concepts--they lie in the people who are given responsibility.

/Question/ How do the Federal Socialists explain the upheavals in the structures of traditional parties? It is said that polarization and incompatible currents exist within the Socialist Federation. What is the truth of these items?

/Answer/ There are numerous reasons in the historic context. There is the struggle of ideas, generations and ideological fragmentation. Lest we speak overlong in analyzing the past, let us look around ourselves. We consider that the rifts which have occurred in the Liberal Grouping do not inspire our amazement or disapproval. This is because the Liberal Grouping is a coalition of a group of interests which are sometimes contradictory. We do not give a great deal of thought to this. However, in the case of the Istiqlal Party, there are currents within it that are creating poles the conflicting positions in which decisionmakers are moving create further confusion and polarization. I am not qualified to spell out contradictions within the programs which have been set forth; the people in the Istiqlal alone can identify points of disturbance.

Addressing ourselves to the Socialist Federation of Popular Powers, we can state without reservation that currents exist within it. This is natural and does not surprise us. The questions our staff members raise lay our options and tendencies out on the table and make them better suited to the tentative activities we are undertaking. I believe that these currents, which ultimately contribute to party unity, express the awareness and deep understanding of the nature of the role and the historic stage Morocco is going through. They are gaining greater effectiveness and endurance for our goals of democracy, socialism and liberation.

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/Question/ Do you believe that there is room within Moroccan parties for Trojan horses working on behalf of foreign regimes? Is there adequate party consciousness to protect party lines against these dangers?

/Answer/ I do not believe that there are Trojan horses on the Moroccan party map. In the past, trivial attempts were made but today the powers are joining forces with the nation in the face of the escalating dangers which hedge us about. There is a consciousness which will keep the Moroccan masses far away from the Lebanese experience, from which intense foreign intervention has arisen.

Part of the Whole

/Question/ You talk a great deal in your press about the "lack of wherewithal for a dialogue between the government and the unions." To what do you ascribe this estrangement?

/Answer/ We rarely hear of discourse between government officials and the unions, that vital element in the economic destiny of the country. People say that we are living in a country that has political and union pluralism. That is not enough. That is a part of the whole, but the whole ought to be a dialogue with workers and producers and agreement on procedures bearing on demands. The demands are still hanging in all fields. We can cite, as an example the Phosphate Organization, the biggest productive installation in Morocco. It has 1,000 workers and an important union exists which speaks for this massive group. Since 1976, when the union was founded, the minister has not received the union bureau, which is empowered to represent the workers. The government states that it is on the side of union rights, freedoms and dialogue, but for 4 years the director general of the ministry refused to meet with trade union officials. It is not enough to talk about democracy. It is necessary to impart true meaning to the notion of democracy. If I ask any of the current ministers about agreements he has concluded with trade union officials, he will not give a positive answer.

/Question/ How can we explain this failure? Are there democracies in the world in the basic sense of the word, in France and Britain for example? Many criticisms have been made of democratic practices.

/Answer/ We in the Socialist Federation are not despairing. There are areas in our exercise of democracy which are improving. However, there are other fields where we consider democracy has been abolished.

/Question/ Will the Socialist Federation withdraw from parliament in the event the 4-year period now in effect is extended?

/Answer/ No one has yet confirmed that the current period of this parliament will be extended. One hears items of news, but it is not in our power to make decisions on the basis of probabilities.

/Question/ It is being said that the circumstances Morocco is going through are crucial and that the country will not tolerate electoral shocks.

/Answer/ Two referenda took place last year--to amend the constitution and set off the election campaign--and we participated in them after we had observed that the

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authorities had mobilized every resource. Why did the government decide on partial elections this month, in Oued El Dahab and other areas of the Oudjda region, Tintane and Djidda? We decided not to take part in them because the issue of guarantees to prevent fraud had not been discussed deeply. We do not claim a majority, although our organizations and staffs fully believe that we are the strongest party on the Moroccan stage. We want integrity. That is a basic Socialist Federation demand.

/29 May-4 Jun 81 pp 40, 45/

/Text/ Abdel Karim Gallab, head of the Istiqlal Unity and Justice Group, has been part of the struggle for independence since the thirties. He was a protege of Allal El Fassi and was imprisoned many times before finishing his literature studies in Cairo. He helped acquaint people with the Moroccan cause as a member of the Temporary Executive Committee of the Istiqlal Party, then as minister plenipotentiary for Arab affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, before he became fully engaged in issues of party struggle, as the editor in chief of the newspaper AL-'ALAM, voice of the Istiqlal Party, and the pursuit of literary and political writing (he has authored more than 25 literary and political works).

This conversation with him is an attempt to ascertain the identity of the Istiqlal Party and its political and ideological place in the Moroccan arena and to evaluate its party experience in the context of the local, regional and international developments which have recently occurred.

/Question/ What are the most prominent characteristics of political life in Morocco as the Istiqlal Party sees them?

/Answer/ The two most prominent features of Moroccan political life are freedom of thought and freedom of action. This freedom may be attributed to a sound concept, which the Istiqlal Party has believed in for a long time, which may be summarized as the refusal to be assimilated into a system of foreign values, French ones in particular. The French, during the periods of national struggle, gave the Istiqlal Party (considering that it was the sole party that existed on the stage at that time) the offer of incorporation into French political movements. The Istiqlal members refused to be incorporated into any foreign movement, since it was their goal to preserve the genuine nature of Istiqlal thinking. We realize that there are political parties and movements which have arisen in countries under French colonization but were directly connected to French organizations. This observation applies to Algeria and the African countries. In Morocco (and in Tunisia also) the notion of avoiding French political hegemony took solid form. The people in Istiqlal implanted the foundations of this principle and rejected the notion of a single party, although they were the only people on the stage. If we go back to the writings of Allal El Fassi, in his work "Self Criticism," we will see that he attacks the notion of a single party and stresses the need for a pluralism of parties in an independent Morocco. After independence, we proceeded to promote an atmosphere of democratic struggle and freedom. We established intellectual, workers' and union societies to liberate discussion from the fetters of disruption through a proliferation of voices. There is no doubt that the democratic tradition has been deeply rooted in the Istiqlal Party vision from the time we presented a petition demanding democracy in the early forties. This is the legacy of our political struggle, especially in the context of everyday practice.

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/Question/ It is said that the Istiqlal Party protects the interests of some affluent groups in Moroccan society, while its power of attraction in toiling labor circles is weak. To what do you ascribe this distinction?

/Answer/ The Istiqlal Party arose from the premises of petty bourgeois groups and the downtrodden working classes in the rural areas and towns. The founders of the Istiqlal Party were students and pupils in secondary schools. The events of 1927 and 1928 are clear on this subject. There is no ambiguity in this regard with respect to the party's first title, that is, the National Action Bloc. The party's mobilization power at that time was concentrated among tradesmen and small merchants, especially in towns which depended on traditional domestic industry such as Fez, Marrakesh, Rabat, Sila, Meknes and Tetouan. These towns were the physical birthplaces of the national movement. The tradesmen constituted the movement's first core, followed by bedouins, peasants and intellectuals of modest means. Up to today, the Istiqlal Party has depended on these professional and social classes. Let us not forget the role of the working class in the party; it played a vanguard role in the clashes which occurred in Morocco on behalf of independence, such as those of 1933, 1936, 1937, 1944 and 1947, when the Moroccan French struggle was at its peak in the towns and rural areas under the command of Marshal Juin. In the light of all this, I do not believe that we are protecting the interests of the upper bourgeoisie. That charge has been directed against us, but is not founded on any basis of specific evidence.

An Obsolete Movement?

/Question/ Well informed circles in opposition parties say that the Istiqlal Party is an obsolete movement which is concerned with past achievements and does not pay attention to the challenges of the present, and thus that the party has lost its early allure of the days of Allal El Fassi, and its power to mobilize has consequently diminished.

/Answer/ That is not true. Let me invite you to the festivals we hold, or the cell meetings we organize periodically, so that you can see the Istiqlal Party's credit and strength by yourself and our power to attract people by using the method of "comradeship" inside and outside our activity. The cell is a group of "comrades" in areas of agriculture, industry and education. The National Assembly composition of the Istiqlal Party (with 400 committed party men) gives evidence of the class composition of our staffs. They are all working people of modest social status, as is the situation with the Organization of the General Federation of Students of Morocco and the Organization of the General Federation of Moroccan Workers.

/Question/ What was Allal El Fassi's role in the Moroccan national movement and the Istiqlal Party specifically? Why is it said that your party lost its allure after the death of El Fassi?

/Answer/ Allal El Fassi was the founder of the national movement. He worked constantly to this end from the time he was 15. He based his mass struggle on a feeling for social justice when he regulated the conditions for the apportionment of water in the city of Fez. He was a poet on public occasions, which made him a point of attraction for broad masses of people, especially among the classes of tradesmen and small manufacturers. He then began to give free classes, which drew people to him in Rabat, Sila, Fez and Tetouan. At that point, under his guidance,

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the National Action Bloc was founded. It held its first organizational meeting and elected Allal as its head although competitors were present. His Istiqlal Party leadership goes back to this period. He was in exile 9 years in Gabon, on grounds that he was the greatest enemy of colonialism, until 1946, when he returned to Morocco. After a few months the French came to view him as a threat and banished him to Cairo and the eastern Arab world. Then he settled in Tangiers, which was under the aegis of international government. From Tangiers he arranged the affairs of the Istiqlal Party until 1952, when he set out over all areas of the country, spreading word of the need for Moroccan independence. He attended the Bandung Conference. After the protectorate left Morocco, he returned and remained as a leader of the nationalists until his death.

/Question/ National movements in the Arab world are opposition movements, except in Morocco, where they are a basic part of the loyal majority. Is there a discrepancy here, and what is it?

/Answer/ The Moroccan national movement differs from movements in the Arab east. It has a national rather than a political one. It arose to combat colonialism. We do not consider the monarchy a chance phenomenon. It is the spiritual and moral framework of the Moroccan nation. Since Islam came to Morocco, we have been linked to the monarch and the people have pledged a conditional loyalty to it. Since independence, in particular, we have considered the monarchy part of the identity of the Moroccan people. Our struggle in the Sahara today shows the profound solidarity between the people and the king. The march we held was a crystallization of liberation activity which the people carried out under the leadership of the king. Thus our participation is not political but one of destiny, a matter of identity. When we were in opposition between 1963 and 1977, we exercised the right of refusal or veto over irresponsible practices on the part of administration figures.

#### The Accomplishments of Democracy

/Question/ How does the Istiqlal Party appraise the current democratic experiment, in terms of gains and weak points alike?

/Answer/ The experiment is a new one in any event and springs from the Moroccan people, who took the risk of formulating the democratic vision. It may be characterized by two phenomena:

1. That of achievements: We have paved the way toward freedom and organizations such as parliament, local councils and a party life aimed at training and enlightening citizens, proposing laws and discussing government programs.
2. That of the opposition: This is one of the fundamental freedoms, taking for example the form of refusing to vote for plans which people in the opposition consider are devoid of harmony and effectiveness. The democratic experiment in Morocco is a success in spite of certain slips it has made, which may be ascribed to its immaturity.

There is no doubt that the Istiqlal Party has taken part in the crystallization of this experiment. Our struggle has been going on since 1925, although goals and directions have changed. Today we are engaged in combatting backwardness, illiteracy and religious and intellectual deviation and are striving toward socio-economic

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liberation, basing ourselves on an ideology which springs from the actual situation of Morocco. We also present solutions which are inspired by the Islamic religion, and of course we benefit from the experiences of others, with the intention of drinking directly from Arab and Islamic springs.

/Question/ Does that mean that the Istiqlal Party does not believe in socialism or struggle among classes, and, if so, don't you believe that there is a class struggle in Morocco which you are trying to conceal with nationalist religious slogans?

/Answer/ At the fifth Istiqlal Party conference which met in early 1960, we set forth the theoretical foundations of Istiqlal ideology. This ideology is based on liberalization, essentially, expresses the state of Moroccan society, and lays out the future lines of development of this society. Thus we do not believe in socialism. We propound a socioeconomic credo which we call egalitarianism.

/Question/ What is the gist of this egalitarianism?

/Answer/ Egalitarianism holds that it is necessary to restrict the difference between classes as a first step in establishing a society without classes. This condition eliminates the class struggle by granting citizens equal opportunities to struggle to improve their standard of living. In the context of egalitarianism, peasants can flourish because they are granted access to expertise, loans, equality, fair wages, housing and medical care. Egalitarianism lays emphasis on the establishment of an economic structure which benefits from capital, directives, nationalization of the basic sources of production in the country, the promotion of decentralization and encouragement of national savings.

/Question/ Why do the people in Istiqlal reject the principles of scientific socialism?

/Answer/ Socialist theories are predictable, and they have given birth to notions which for the most part have failed. In addition, scientific socialism is apostasy, while egalitarianism believes in religion, religion as belief and conduct. It is correct Islamic form, it inspires intellectual, political and economic activity. Belief in God liberates man from superstition and links him to the fully-rounded model of the upright life which Islam has portrayed, in terms of individual and collective freedom and social justice, on grounds that money is an inexhaustible means to free man from capitalism, usury, human dominance and greed. It is unfortunate that the slogan of socialism is generally embraced to conceal totalitarian military apparatuses, in third world countries especially. Today there are different socialisms, not a single one, whereas there is a single Moroccan egalitarianism, which the Istiqlal Party defends.

/Question/ The French thinker Henri Febvre, in his book "An Introduction to the New Spirit," says that /the term/ scientific socialism has been used by the socialist regimes established according to the criteria of some people in Asia and Latin America and that its prime objective is to establish a society without classes.

/Answer/ Whatever the diverse forms of socialism might be, they entertain a materialistic view of life and of people and ignore unknown forces and spiritual values. Even the society liberated from classes which it wants to build presupposes the domination of one class by another by enabling what is called the proletariat to

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rise to power and monopolize the material and moral opportunities that had been available to other classes. This leads to the spread of resentment and hostility among people. That does not mean that egalitarian ideology does not adhere to the struggle against exploitation but rather that we want, before all else, to eat the grape, not kill the gamewarden--that is, to create equal work opportunities, not sow animosity. Our sole channel of activity is democratic struggle, not that of kindling the spirit of monopolization and lust for outrageous profits.

/Question/ The Istiqlal Party is now represented in the cabinet. How do you embody the principles of egalitarianism in actual conditions? What achievement have you made? It is said that you have offered basic concessions regarding your party's program in order to avoid "balkanizing government action." Is this true?

/Answer/ I do not believe that the Istiqlal group in the cabinet has made basic concessions concerning the programs and plans it presents in the cabinet. The road we are following is that of struggling to support our principles to realize many of our ideas through democratic channels. The ministries the Istiqlal people occupy are of importance in the current lineup, since we are able to fill the gap among classes. For example, the minister of education belongs to the Istiqlal and he is working to ensure an education for all people and to shift courses into the Arabic language. These are orientations that have been at the core of the Istiqlal program since the days of the national movement. Let us not forget the importance of language unification in drawing ranks together on the national level and making the struggle against backwardness effective. There are the two Ministries of Equipment and Housing, which are both striving to raise the level of the downtrodden classes and create modern public structures and utilities. These equations lie within the framework of the development upsurge which all Moroccans are benefitting from.

## Unfair Accusations

/Question/ There is unanimity in Moroccan political and party circles that the Istiqlal Party can be characterized by paralysis. Some of these circles criticize it for failing to develop and keep abreast of the pace of current challenges and hold that the same persons are in decisionmaking positions and are geographically and intellectually characterized by a conservative attitude. It is stated, for instance, that most of the Istiqlal leaders are from the city of Fez. What about this?

/Answer/ This talk is part of the unfair charges that are directed against the Istiqlal Party. Tradition does not mean that we are living in another time and place, and the preservation of intellectual and moral principles and standards does not mean that we have become petrified. I believe that we are zealously keeping up with the pace of the times and are sparing no effort in developing and renewing our party staffs and ideas. The charge of introversion has become an old one, especially since we are earnestly keeping up with current events in Morocco and the aspirations of the Moroccan people. In spite of the developments and shifts that are occurring in the outer world, we are adhering to our ideology on principle and reject mercurial positions and "moving the rifle from shoulder to shoulder." Alert staffs exist within the Istiqlal Party which grasp the most modern economic and social theories. In addition, new party officials in the regions and provinces

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are elected every 3 years at party conventions. The changes are pyramidal in fashion and cover the base and the apex. The young people are the personnel who are changed the most and they are the basis of every change in the context of leadership and responsibility.

/Question/ You contested the results of the latest elections. However, you did not boycott the regime. Isn't there a schizophrenia between theory and practice?

/Answer/ We have more than once drawn attention to the need to avoid frustrating the course of democracy, not in terms of the damage which has befallen us but out of our belief that the experiment of political pluralism which Morocco is going through must continue without letup or disruption. However, our objective in entering the regime was to fight the deficiencies instead of running away and settling on misleading slogans. Here is where the Istiqlal Party is realistic and persistent in the process of struggling on all levels for liberation from backwardness and for emerging into the age of national developmental consciousness in a balanced fashion.

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SUDAN

AID FOR INDUSTRIALIZATION DISCUSSED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 15 May 81 p 1354

[Text] In our issue of last 10 April (p 997), we reported the convening at Khartoum, from 23 to 26 March, under UNIDO auspices, of a "solidarity meeting," with the participation of 26 developing countries, invited to take part in the Sudan's industrial development, as well as of international organizations.

A series of proposals for collaboration with the public industrial sector was submitted to the delegates, and many representatives of the Sudanese industrial sector were present, facilitating bilateral-level discussions.

The industrial sectors concerned were the following: construction materials; food industries; the edible oil industry; sugar; the leather, textile and chemical industries; production of spare parts; industrial utilization of natural resources; energy; consulting engineering activities. More than 40 projects were thus proposed. Many expressions of interest were noted, put in concrete form by several preliminary bilateral agreements.

With Algeria: a project for modernizing Khartoum's central foundry. Financing: \$400,000 from the Algerian Government.

With China: a clothing factory in Khartoum. Financing: \$100,000 from the Chinese Government.

With India: technical assistance to study the uses of bagasse; assistance in setting up training centers for the sugar and tanning industries; technical cooperation with the Industrial Research Institute, the control center for textile quality. Financing: \$250,000 from the Indian Government.

With Oman: a feasibility study for a paper pulp project; cold storage of hides. Financing: \$220,000 from the Omani Government.

With Qatar: a hydraulic and quicklime factory. Financing: gift from the Qatari Government.

With Yugoslavia: a pilot brick-manufacturing plant. Financing: a gift of \$900,000 from the Yugoslav Government.

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Various other proposals were submitted for the agreement of the governments concerned. The participation at this conference of a representative of the Arab Investment Guarantee Corporation of Kuwait and of the Islamic Development Bank was noted.

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SUDAN

MINERAL RESEARCH SUMMARIZED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 22 May 81 p 1409

[Text] The mining of ores should develop on a large scale in the Sudan in the next few years, in view of the many contracts in embryonic stages at the present time in this field and of the important research in progress. Chrome, mica and gypsum, and gold are the minerals being worked at this time, with a low, but constantly increasing, rate of production, especially for chrome. In 1979, 30,000 tons of chrome ore, 2,000 tons of mica and about 15,000 tons of gypsum were produced.

In this field of research, a large number of projects are under way:

A study and prospecting campaign in the Bayunda desert north of Khartoum by the geological studies department of the Ministry of Energy and Mines, with German technical assistance. This campaign made it possible to detect traces of disthene. The Kloeckner company is studying, at this stage, the formation of a joint venture for working this deposit. Another research and exploration phase is now under way in the Nuba Mountains, and copper deposits have apparently been discovered.

Prospecting for uranium by the Minex company (United States) in the northern part of the Nuba Mountains and for gold in the western part of the Red Sea Hills in the Nubian desert.

A search for uranium and copper in the Hofrat el Nahaz (South Darfour) by the Chevron company (United States).

Prospecting for diamonds by a United Nations team (UNDP) in the south of the country.

A search for gold by Belgian technical assistance in the south.

The prospecting phase developed several years ago by the French Geological and Mineral Prospecting Office (GMPO), with the geological studies department of the Ministry of Energy and Mines, made it possible to detect the presence of various mineral deposits interesting enough to justify a study of their development. The GMPO and the French Petroleum Company (FPC) are expected shortly to finalize the establishment of a joint venture for the working of various minerals such as tungsten, barytes and gold.

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SUDAN

## AUTOMOBILE IMPORT SOURCES, AMOUNTS REVIEWED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 22 May 81 p 1409

[Text] According to indications given by the Sudanese department of statistics, imports of motor vehicles into the Sudan in 1979 amounted to: 2,572 private cars, at a cost of 5.4 million Sudanese pounds; 121 vehicles for the public transport of passengers, at a cost of 511,000 Sudanese pounds; 618 vehicles for the transport of goods, at a cost of 5 million Sudanese pounds. The principal origins of these imports (in units) are as follows:

<u>Private Cars</u>	2,572
United Kingdom	937
Republic of Korea	641
France	331
Japan	149
Saudi Arabia	334
FRG	38
Netherlands	20
Egypt	21
Belgium	30
<u>Passenger Transport Vehicles</u>	121
Belgium	70
FRG	13
France	13
Japan	10
Saudi Arabia	6
<u>Vehicles for the Transport of Goods</u>	618
United Kingdom	423
FRG	45
Japan	56
Republic of Korea	22
Saudi Arabia	16
Sweden	10

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SUDAN

RESTORATION OF WHITE NILE PUMPING STATIONS REVIEWED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 15 May 81 p 1354

[Text] In our issue of last 3 April (p 938), we published a note on the project for the restoration of the Blue Nile pumping stations, to which the African Development Bank and the World Bank group are making their contribution. A similar project is under way for the White Nile.

The project for the restoration of the White Nile pumping stations has as its goal reviving, in 5 years, the some 174 irrigated farms bordering the White Nile south of Khartoum, where cotton, sorghum and wheat are grown. The result of this would be an increase in productivity, a rise in cotton exports, increased resources for the farmers and a better financial balance for the farms. The receipts expected for the public sector are on the order of 370 million Sudanese pounds, and the number of families directly concerned is 28,000.

To achieve these objectives, the following means will be made available to the farms: agricultural mechanization and equipment; financial means; workshops and facilities for fuel storage; vehicles and a telecommunications network; the modernization of pumps and the irrigation network; the construction of offices, stores and housing for the training personnel. In addition, measures will be taken to encourage sound management and administration of the projects, and studies will be made in order to help the future development of this region.

Among the most serious risks that could hinder the realization of this project, we should note shortages and delays in implementation of local means, failure to achieve anticipated production, a shortage of foreign currency, bad management. Measures have already been taken to solve these problems.

The World Bank has granted a sum of \$35 million to finance this project.

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SUDAN

BRIEFS

SAUDI AID--Saudi Arabia has just granted the Sudan a loan of \$100 million on favorable terms, in order to maintain the Sudan's balance of payments. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 22 May 81 p 1409] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 9434

PESTICIDE PRODUCTS--French commercial services in Khartoum report that the result of the invitations to tender for the supply of herbicides and insecticides for the next cotton drive show a new improvement in the position of the Rhone-Poulenc company, to the disadvantage of the Swiss company Ciba-Geigy. Rhone-Poulenc has about a third of the total market this year, which, added to the share obtained by Roussel-Uclaf, brings the French share to about 40 percent of a total of \$60 million in products supplied. This total, divided between \$10 million for herbicides and \$50 million for insecticides, will be financed in part by local resources and above all by aid from various Arab funds, including the Islamic Development Bank. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 5 Jun 81 p 1530] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 9434

LOAN FROM SPAIN--Following the visit to Spain, in April, of a Sudanese delegation headed by Ahmad Salim Ahmad, minister of cooperation, commerce and supply, the methods of use of a Spanish loan to the Sudan of \$17.5 million were clarified. This loan will serve for the purchase in Spain of goods such as buses, trucks, electrical equipment and tank trucks for the transport of petroleum products. Spain will also grant the Sudan credit in the amount of \$15 million for the purchase of road equipment, tractors, agricultural machines and industrial bakeries. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 5 Jun 81 p 1530] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 9434

SOY PROJECT--Under the protocol signed between Canada and the Sudan's Agricultural Research Corporation, experimentation with different varieties of soybean is being undertaken at Abu Na'amah. Canada will provide \$250,000 for this project in the form of seeds and technical assistance. This project fits in with the line of similar programs being conducted at present at Kaduqli and at Kinanah by the United States. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 5 Jun 81 p 1530] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 9434

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